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The proposal involves modifying the current concept of High Occupancy Vehicle (HOV) lanes Cun°ent HOV lanes are not very effective at reducing traffic; 43 percent of car-poolers are members of the same household. They cost everyone but serve few drivers. We propose replacing HOV lanes with HOT lanes High Occupancy/Toll lanes A HOT lane would give free passage to three-occupant vehicles (HOV3s) but permit all others to pay a peak-hour toll for access. Th~s would utilize more of the lane's capacity, demonstrate congestion pricing on a wide scale, and generate revenues to pay for HOT lane construction. In cases where the choice is between a HOT lane or no additmnat lane, the HOT-lane option also promotes ridesharing Existing HOV lanes would be converted to HOT lanes, and planned HOV lanes built as HOT lanes instead Once a HOT lane reached capacity and there was demand for more of its services, the adjacent lane would be converted to a second HOT lane. Over txme this process could be repeated Two Southern California projects will soon offer drivers the opportumty to experience HOT lanes One is the private toll lanes project under construction on the Riverside Freeway (SR 91) m Orange County. The other ~s a planned HOT lane conversion on 1-15 in San Diego County.
HOT lanes at surface levels can often be financmlty self-supporting from toll revenues, thereby permxtting the expansion of the planned Southern Califomla HOV network with private capital, rather than hmited pubhc funds. Elevated HOT lanes, which are much more costly, could be dew,loped as public-private partnerships with mixed funding Provisions for private construction and operation of toll lanes on existing freeways already exist in the law of both Cahfornm and the federal government 
I, INTRODUCTION
Advanced technologies have made it as easy to pnce highways as it is to price telephone serwce, miniature golf, or entrance to a movie theater The transaction costs of manual toll collection have been ehminated by Automated Vehicle Identification (AVI) and Electronic Toll Collection (ETC) These developments allow congested highways to be pnced like any other scarce commodity so as to manage demand and provide an inducement to investment m transportation services.
A consensus has emerged among economlsts and pohcy analysts that charging for roads provides the only efficient solution to hlghway congestmn m urban areas But this view ts not widely shared by the public Some transportatmn officials, elected officials, and involved citizens prefer solutions that mandate rldesharmg, expand transit services, or attempt to build a way out of the problem. Yet, tax revenues continue to fall short of projected improvements Previous studies from the Reason Foundation have outlined the thes~s that as road space is a scarce resource, and transportatmn developments strata pubhc finances, the most efficient way to allocate use and finance construction is vm congestion pricing
We seek to extend this idea by showxng how High Occupancy Vehicle (HOV) lanes can gr~lually converted to High Occupancy/Toll (HOT) lanes 1 Our thes~s is that opinions towards pricing will change only once officials and involved members of the pubhc have become acquainted with pricing on hxghways Only then will they realize the potential to" 1) reduce the cos't of rnovang people and goods; and 2) generate money for highway improvements Thmr aversion to the loss of benefits enjoyed from a "free" road obscures the benefits to be achieved by pncmg
When developing new highways, engineers and the public are more open to the idea of tolhng, because toll financing ~s seen as a way to pay for construction of the facility But when it comes to existing freeways, they are often opposed to retrofitting with a pricing mechamsm Drwers beheve they have the nght to travel when and where they desire regardless of the congestion they create. This is the main reason why roads are congested at peak hours If commuters were charged the social cost for using roads, then ridesharlng, tnp rescheduhng and transit use would increase But we have all become accustomed to a sociallzed road system.
The; result, as for example m agricultural pohcy, is perpetuatmn of the bad pohcy--namely, prov~dlng highways as "free"-ways Increasing congestion and the enormous cost of constructing new facflmes call for a different approach, but the public mind exhibits a strong status quo bias The art of polmcal reform becomes finding ways of working around the llmxtatmns of the pubhc mind A strategy of gradual reform is required
The avallabihty of HOV lanes on urban freeways provides an opportunity to introduce pricing When capacity is underutlllzed, HOV lanes could be converted to HOT lanes to demonstrate the abihty of congestion pricing to improve mobility The HOT lanes concept would introduce tolhng gently, one lane at a time over the span of decades It would be an incremental strategy that could be expanded as the merit of the policy was reahzed
The best program of pricing allows charges to vary with congestion condmons Economists use the term congestion pricing to distinguish variable tolls from the fixed tolls we're accustomed to on bridges Telephone companies and many other enterprises have employed demand-variable price techniques for years to xmprove the match between user needs and capacity
II. STATUS QUO BIAS
Allhough we fancy ourselves consistent and fully rational beings, a more ~ronic self-image suits us better Economists and social psycholog~sts have discovered numerous anomalies to the simple picture of consistency and rationahty People do not have unbounded powers to ass~mllate reformation and work out optimal strategies. They rely on hunches and rules of thumb Furthermore, how they assess a situation sometimes depends on where they are standing The anomaly that concerns us here ~s one that researchers have called the "status quo bins ,2 Suppose you wm a pair of tickets to the World Series. Your nmghbor says, "WowV," and offers you $60 for the tickets. You say "No way" However, had you not won the tickets, you would not have been wllhng to buy a pmr for $60. You are not wilhng to sell at $60, but also you would not have been willing to buy at $60
Consider another example In a classroom of college students, researchers gave a Cornell coffee mug to every other student All students were asked to examine a mug, either their own or their neighbor's. The researchers then asked mug-owners to write down the minimum price that they would take for their mug, and those w~thout mugs to write down the maximum price they would pay for a mug. These bid-ask exchanges were carried out at random, and there was no incentive for students to misrepresent their preferences Now, since the mugs were distributed at random, we might expect that the mug-owners would value a mug no more than the others The prices written down would, in that case, be samllar across the two groups. But that's not the way it really works Once you gwe something to someone and tell her ~t's hers, she immediately develops an attachment to the object or amenity, an attachment that an onlooker does not develop. The median mug-owner asked $5 25 for his mug, while the median mug buyer offered only $2.50. 3 After just a few minutes of establishing a slatus quo of mug ownership, those with mugs came to value them twine as much as those w~thout mugs~
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The coffee mug example is just one of many experiments that researchers have conducted to demonstrate the status quo bias After controlhng for all imaginable alternative explanations, researchers continue to find that people have a substantial impulse to hold on to what they have When people have the opportumty to change their status quo, the loss aspects of the change consistently loom larger than the gmn aspects Researchers demonstrate this simply by endowing individuals differently and then offenng the change Consider the example of the World Series t~ckets m the status quo of t~cket-ownership, losing the tickets looms larger than galmng $60 But m the status quo of no-tickets, losing $60 looms larger than gmmng the tickets Besides the personal attachment to the famlhar versus the vlsable but unfamiliar, we must further recognize that in practice the gains of change are not visible Losses are the removal of v~sable, existmg benefits Gains, by contrast, are only prospective. They often are hard to xmagme and hard to describe, and the pubhc has no incentive to make the effort The public recogmzes losses much more readily than gains, which often come to be demgrated as "vague" or "merely speculative" Whenever someone proposes cuts m government servxces, the status quo bias operates because losing the existing benefits of the servlces is tangible, whereas the prospective gains associated w~th fiscal conservation are impossible to know and impossible to describe.
The ~mphcations of the status quo bias and the invisibility of prospective gmns are important. ExLstmg policy arrangements might be favored by the public, not because they are inherently better or more efficient, but simply because they existV When ~meone proposes pnvat~zang the U S. Postal Service, the pubhc feels a threat to the services it has grown accustomed to, and might sympathize with the employees who would lose then" jobs. 4 When someone proposes retrofitting tolling on a freeway, the public feels a threat to the familiar way of travel, naturally s3,mpathizang with the regular users who would suddenly have to pay for something they used to get for free. The bmses suggest that a change foisted upon the public, a change that the public would resist If ~t could, would eventually become the new status quo, and the pubhc would grow samllarly attached to at Although it has been only recently that researchers have accumulated experimental evadence of status quo bias, writers have long been aware of the phenomenon Consider the following quotatmns Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes (1897) The status quo bias tells reformers that they need to be especially sensitive to the losing groups One helpful strategy is to compensate losers for their losses Another is to tiptoe around the status quo, to distribute losses over the population and over time. so no self-aware and wsible objector group develops A gradual approach m~ght succeed where an all-at-once approach would fall
IlL TRAFFIC CONGESTION AND EXPANSION OF HOV FACILITIES
The astonishing increase In automobiles and thmr use for commuting has caused traffic jams in metropolitan areas The number of cars and hght trucks increased almost 50 percent nationwide between 1975 and 1990, a period when it has become difficult to expand highway capacity In metropolitan areas, where employment has expanded and women are most hkely to pamcIpate m |he labor force, traffic congestmn has increased and is likely to continue increasing to some degree Increasing ndesharing is one way to reduce traffic congestion The time and bother of coordinating shared travel, however, tends to outweigh the personal sawngs from ridesharing as people become more affluent Between 1977 and 1990, rideshanng natmnwlde dechned, and wall continue to do so unless policies that promote ridesharing are implemented HOV lanes in California, for example, have successfully increased ndesharlng m some locations After two HOV lanes were added to State Route 55 in 1985, average vehicle occupancy on all lanes increased from 1 17 to 1 26 during the first year. This means that 7.2 percent fewer vehicles were reqmred to transport the same number of travelers The addition of HOV lanes has occurred throughout the nation, and major addmons are planned for metropohtan areas in the South and west (see Table 1 ). Upping the HOV reqmrement and permitting SOV buy-ms into the HOV lanes--converting them into HOT lanes--would counter these deficiencies
IV'. A STRATEGY FOR ACHIEVING CONGESTION PRICING: HOT LANES
Permattlng single-occupant vehicles (SOVs) to buy into the HOV lanes would produce many benefits wath only small losses In the case of an exasting HOV lane, HOV2 travelers would suffer because they would have to purchase access But a regular HOV traveler might also have to travel on occasion as an SOV traveler who would opt to buy-in In practice, the set of losers Is not easy to identify.
Charges would be varied to encourage efficient use whale permitting HOV3s to pass free Travelers would stall have some added incentave to form HOV2s, since the travelers could spht the cost of the charge and enjoy speedier travel And HOT lanes could potentially pay for themselves an congested corridors and attract private investment into h~ghways
In terms of shifting the status quo, many motorists would invest m ETC equipment to make use of the HOT lane and other toll facfimes in the regaon The population of SOVs would not be dlwded into those who always use HOT lanes and those who never do Rather, SOVs will opt for the HOT lane depending on their t~me constraints and the prevailing charge at that time of day. In consequence, a large fraction of the population might be occasional HOT-lane users.
Being able to obtain superior service when pressed for time wall lead people to support having differential services on the highways. And people will gradually become accustomed to paying for highway travel
Another way that HOT lanes help to "shoehorn" pricing into pubhc practice is that HOT lanes generate revenues for highway improvements Revenues from the SOV buy-ins can be used to upgrade the highway, or to finance the HOT lane ~tself in the case of a newly constructed lane
Once a HOT lane is operating at capacity, expansmn of pricing into a conventmnal lane would have a constituency of user support Motorists will have come to apprecmte the benefits of dffterentlal services, many people will have already eqmpped their car with ETC, and the freeway ethJc will have been undermined. As the pubhc gradually comes to understand that charging users
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Pha~mg m Congestwn Prtcmg is superior to general taxatlon for road financing, perhaps complete retrofitting will be feaslble Figure 1 shows the phases of the evolution of a freeway into a tollway, beginmng with the con verston of a conventional lane into a HOV lane. Figure 2 shows the evolution, beginning with the constmctton of a HOT lane The ambmous plan to add HOV lanes on every freeway m Los Angeles County provides an opportunity to use the HOT-lanes approach Although Los Angeles and Orange counties already have more HOV lanes than any other metropolitan area, the $6 2 bfihon expansmn plan for the next 30 years must compete with rml programs that enjoy broad pubhc support 9 Furthermore, major revenue shortfalls are expected over the next ten years Self-financing achieved by pricing could improve the ltkehhood of actually achieving the new capacity called for by the HOV plans
V. RECENT DEVFI OPMENTS OF HOT LANES
Some existing faclhtles, such as the San Francisco bridges, combine free HOV3 passage with tolhng for lower occupancy vehicles More significant examples of HOT lane projects are now under way
A. The lntermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (1991)
The idea of HOT lanes is part of a broader movement toward the tolhng and privatlzatlon of highways, bridges, and tunnels Often prlvatization arrangements take the form of braid-operatetransfer projects (BOT) The movement is especially strong in Asia and Europe, 1° but the United States has also taken deflmte steps in the same direction In 1991 Congress passed the Intermodal Surface Transportatmn Efficiency Act (ISTEA), which reversed the longstanding federal policies against toll facilities ISTEA permits federal funds to be used on tolled facilities--up to 50 percent for highways and 80 percent for tunnels and bridges. ISTEA sheds the old requirement that federal funds be repmd ff the highway is prlvatized; ~t permits tolling to be retained after the debt is retired; and, most pertinent for HOT lanes, ~t allows federal rights of way to be used for toiled expansmn of exastmg haghways Seven states and Puerto Rico have enacted pnvate-tollway legtslatmn, and others are m the process of doing so 11
Sectmn 1012(b) of ISTEA authorizes the Federal Haghway Admmastration (FHWA) commxssmn five demonstration projects using congestmn pricing. Some 16 projects were submitted in January 1993, from whach one, congestion pricing on the San Francasco Bay Bridge, was selected Several projects proposed variatmns of HOT lanes but these were not selected The FHWA announced in the Federal Regtster that all types of HOV buy-in proposals wall be excluded from congestion pricing pilot projects under ISTEA, asserting that "HOV buy-in prolects would not promote the congestion relief and related mr quality and energy conservation objectwes of the ISTEA "I" This exclusion of HOT lane projects pertmns only to the current sohc~tatmn period (through November 1993), but might be an indlcataon of attitudes that will continue to prevail. Although ISTEA money will not be assisting HOT-lane projects m the near term, HOT-lane projects of each type---construction and conversmn--are already under way
B. HOT-Lane Construction: The SR 91 Project in California
In the median of State Route 91, the primary link between Orange and Riverside Counues, the Cahfornia Private Transportation Corporation (CPTC) has been granted the right to plan, construct, and operate four tolled lanes for 35 years. These lanes wall operate hke a HOV facdaty, penmttmg vehicles with three or more (HOV3) to travel free at first, and at a discount later, should their use hamper profitability Vehacles with one or two occupants will be permitted to buy-re.
Congestion on State Route 91 is already severe for five hours each day. Caltrans had planned one HOV lane each direction in the medaan, and had cleared the project environmentally, but had
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Phasmg m Congestton Prtcmg insufficient money for construction. By making excess HOV lane capacity available to toll-paying vehicles, CPTC estimates that the charges will be sufficient to cover operating costs as well as provide a 17-percent return on investment (which is capped under the franchise). An addmonal 6 percent can be earned by increasrng vehicle occupancy levels, any such excess income must be' shared wxth the state PIehmmary estimates in&care that travelers would be wllhng to pay a charge of $2 50 per trip during peak hours for the Ume saved to travel the I0 miles. Charges will vary m response to demand, rates will be increased dunng peak periods to avoid congestion in the reserved lanes, wtth roadway signs designed to flash amounts as hlgh as $9 99 Although this project is one of the four major projects launched by California's law AB 680 m 1989, it is a HOT lane constructmn project since it is tolled expansion of an exlstmg freeway, and it exempts HOV3 vehxcles from the charge Gordon J Fielding (1993) In 1991, SANDAG developed the 1-15 Transit Development and Congestion Pricing Demonstratmn ProJect, which would permit SOV buy-ins to the two reversible HOV lanes. The first phase would implement a low technology approach by offering a "subscription-decal," allowing SOVs to enter the HOV lane without stoppmg to pay a cash toil. The second phase would implement an AVI system Although SANDAG has been demed funding under ISTEA, the Federal Transit Admimstration has awarded SANDAG a grant for transit development and the HOT lanes project in the eight-mile segment of 1-15 Assemblyman Jan Goldsmith, former mayor of Poway, was instrumental in passing Cahfomla enabhng legislation for the project (AB 713) Thls measure was enacted in September 1993, permitting the project to go forward San Dlegans seem to be eager to buy into the under-utdlzed HOV lanes. Project director John Duve reports that "The proposed Demonstration has received substantial and continuous coverage by the media Each article or commentary has been supportive of the proposed Demonstratxon project ,14 The pubhc seems willing to undergo HOT lane conversion, whereas it would probably resist stoutly an attempt at retrofitting pricing all at once
Vi. FINANCIAL FEASIBILITY
Can HOT lanes actually be financially self-sufficient and therefore attractwe to the private sector9 This section develops order-of-magmtude estimates of the financial feaslbihty of HOT lanes Table 2 The optimistic scenario (from a financial standpoint v) is that congestion lasts seven hours a day, six days per week, 52 weeks a year. Dunng these pnced hours, the charge for lower-occupancy vehicles is 25 cents per mile to use the HOT3 lane The lane cames 2,000 vehicles per hour per mile, 70 percent of which are lower-occupancy and pay the charge Annual revenue per lane mile an this case is $764,400
How do these revenues compare with costs? To obtain a range of financial returns, we wall again produce pessimistic and optimistic estimates Assume that the surface-level HOT lane costs $5 mflhon per lane-mile and that revenues equal the lower of our two estimates. In this case, gross revenues would return only 7 6 percent of the construction costs per year to investors. This is not a sufficient return to attract debt or equity investment, nor does it account for operating (e.g, electronic toll-collection) and maintenance expenses If we substitute the high-revenue scenario, the gross return ~s 15 3 percent of construction costs per year, a figure which begins to approach a plausible market return (again, neglecting operating costs)
If we construct the most optamastic case, using the low end of the construction cost range ($2 14 per lane-mile) and the high end of the revenue range ($764,400 per lane-male), the gross return on investment is 35 7 percent If annual operating and maintenance expenses equal 10 percent Fol the elevated HOT lanes, the extremely h~gh construction costs would reqmre unreasonably high toll levels m order to achieve a commercial rate of retum To obtain a 15 percent annual return on an investment of $20 million per mile would require a rush-hour toll in the vicinity of $1 per mile
The conclusion from this brief exercise is that some surface-level HOT lanes could be financaally feasible as private-sector projects of the kind already embodied in Callfornia's existing AB 680 program. On the other hand, where revenues would not be sufficient to achieve the required commercial rates of return (as in the case of elevated HOT lanes), a pubhc-prlvate partnership of the kand authorized under ISTEA would permit private capital to cover a large fraction of the cost Thus, California could achieve additional highway capacity in the form of HOT lanes with a relatively small outlay of pubhc funds
Vllo HOW TO FRANCHISE HOT LANES: MARGINAL-RETURN BIDDING
The message that we seek to convey is that HOT lanes can popularize congestion pricing. But this approach can also generate private investment m public improvements These two themes are interrelated, because without the added revenue generated by pricing, private construcuon and operation of highways is not financially attractive.
Since HOT lanes m congested corridors can be self-financing, we suggest that HOT lane projects be carried out and operated by private enterprise How xs the contract for a HOT lane project to be awarded?
In a paper t~tled "How to Franchise Highways," we proposed a scheme for the government to conduct a head-to-head competition for the franchise contract to construct and operate a new h~ghway facilityJ 6 The scheme, called marginal-return bidding, is designed to select the most cost-effective contestant, to encourage cost minimization during construction, to limit profit rates, and to minimize post-contractual administering of the contract. The method ~s well-stated to any franchise project that has the following features: a large up-front investment, the approximate cost of the investment can be rehably estimated, the operating costs are small compared to the costs of lmt~al construction, the project generates a continuing stream of income, and the approximate income can be reliably estimated HOT lane projects, either of the construcUon or conversion variety, satisfy these condltions Here we briefly explain our scheme.
We propose that franctuse bidding take the form of marginal-return cap schedules The idea ~s best explained by an example.
Suppose that the state has accomphshed the design and environmental approval of a HOT lane project The state estimates the cost of completing the project to be $500 miltion The state has written the contract and only needs to determine ItS holder The state presents the solid hnes shown m Fxgure 3, which we call the format portion of the rate-of-return cap schedule. The format schedule permits 30 percent earnings on the first $200 mflhon, 10 percent on the next $100 milhon, is undefined on the next $300 million, and 5 percent on anything more than $600 mdlion The umdentified portion--from $300 million to $600 million--is filled in by the winning bid A contestant's bid takes the form of a straight hne segment connecting point d to the vemcal hne at $600 million (line MN). Let z be the sxgned vertical distance on MN from point Therefore, for example, at point f the z value is 0 10, at point g it is zero Bids are essentially z's, and may go below zero. The lowest z wins the franchise Suppose a contestant wins the franchise with a bid of z equal to zero. Its return schedule would be the format schedule plus the dotted hne If costs turned out to be $500 milhon, its annual cap return would be area A plus trapezoid B (which sum to $83 3 million, or a 16 7 percent return). The return cap on the marginal dollar (the 500 mdhonth) would be 3.3 percent, a rate slgn~ficantly below what that dollar could earn in an alternative investment. On the margin the operator ~s dxscouraged from inflating costs And as costs increase, this discouragement becomes more severe For example, if costs were $550 mllhon, the average return would drop to 15 4 percent and the marginal return to 1 7 percent.
The format return schedule shown in Figure 3 1s only an example In any actual case, the faclhtator would draw the format schedule based on the conditions of the project in quesnon The beauty of the bid component is that the competitive framework will utihze knowledge that is dispersed among the contestants, and will adjust the total return cap appropriately Figure 3 Marginal-Return Bidding
The solid line is the format remm schedule given by the faeihtator. The dotted line is an example of a bid. Fo~ HOT lane projects that will not be self-financing, the state can still use marginal-return bidding to franchise the project, but it would have to add a fixed subsidy to the package Such a f~xed subsidy would not affect the operauon of the franchise competmon, nor the incentwes of the franchise winner Marganal-return bidding combines the virtues of competitive franchise Nddmg with the virtues of tradmonal rate-of-return regulataon, whale avoiding their worst vices Like competitive bidding, at preserves head-to-head competitmn for the field and tends to select the most efficient contestant Also, it discourages gold plating and internal inefficiency--serious problems with traditional rate of return regulation. The operator has the incentive to achieve performance specifications at the lowest possable cost Unhke some forms of competative Nddlng, it leaves pricing flexible, so appropriate toll practices can be developed in response to demand 17 Furthermore, ~t requires little post-contractual administering of the contract Whereas tradltlonal rate-of-return regulation requires careful monitoring to guard against gold plating, marginal-return bidding only needs to document costs The state could simply audit the operator's books Determining whether certain expenditures were m fact made is a much simpler task that determining whether they were good ones to make.
Annual
This presentation of marginal-return bidding has ignored severn important factors 1) arrangements for operating costs; 2) excess earnings and bonus incentives, 3) monopoly power and the marginal user; and 4) collusion in bidding. The reader is referred to our paper "How to Franchise Highways" for a discussion of these points.
Viral. CONCLUSION
When it comes to changes in public policy, the public exhibits a tenacious will to maintmn the status quo Partly this as due to personal psychology: people become attached to whatever they are accustomed to, and the losses of any proposed reform loom larger than the prospective gmns And partly it Is due to invi~bllity of prospective benefits The benefits do not have a support constituency and remain poorly understood.
Although researchers have supported the idea of highway pricing for decades, and now w~th advanced technology the case is stronger than ever, the public remmns reluctant to retrofit highways with pricing We propose to overcome the status quo bias by introducing pricing gradually in the form of HOT lanes
The chief reservation about HOT lanes is that HOT lanes will injure the progress of rideshanng The validity of this point depends significantly on the type of HOT lane project When a HOT lane is converted from a pre-existing HOV lane, there is a possible detrimental effect on ndeshanng, as some rldesharers will opt to take the fast lane as a SOV buy-re. Also, the SOV buy-ms will reduce the time saving in the HOT lane, leading some would-be rldesharers to travel solo m the conventional lanes. However, increasing the rideshanng requirement to HOT3 would give an incentive to travelers to form three-person carpools.
Converting a HOV lane into a HOT lane will introduce a more efficient method of financing highways, and the funds can be used for upgrading and maintaining the highway. Nearly all motorists wall find a benefit m being able to take the speedier lane when time is precmus Finally, improved utilization of the reserved lane will relieve slightly, congestion m the conventional lanes Reports from the SANDAG I-15 project suggest that, in the public mind, these prospective benefits outweigh the damage done to ndeshanng
In the case of HOT lanes being newly constructed and expansmn being impossible w~thout the toll revenue base, there are only benefits. Thanks to the revenue from SOV buy-ms, the pubhc recewes a highway expansion that offers differential service. Differential service ~s valuable to everyone because it permits each to avoid costly delays when t~me is especially precious As for ndeshanng, the new HOT lanes would be an inducement 
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